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Abstract
Economic policy evaluations require social welfare functions for variable-size pop-
ulations. Two important candidates are critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU)
and rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism, which was recently char-
acterized by Asheim and Zuber (2014) (AZ). AZ introduce a novel axiom, existence of
egalitarian equivalence (EEE). First, we show that, under some uncontroversial criteria
for a plausible social welfare relation, EEE suffices to rule out the Repugnant Conclu-
sion of population ethics (without AZ’s other novel axioms). Second, we provide a
new characterization of CLGU: AZ’s set of axioms is equivalent to CLGU when EEE is
replaced by the axiom same-number independence.
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1 Introduction
Population ethics studies the axiomatic properties of social welfare relations for different-
sized populations. In one of the most important recent advances of this literature, Asheim
and Zuber (2014) (hereafter AZ) have proposed and axiomatized rank-discounted gen-
eralized utilitarianism (RDGU), which has been further investigated by Pivato (2020).
AZ show that RDGU escapes the “Repugnant Conclusion” (Parfit, 1984), a well-studied
property of some approaches to population ethics.1
Here we document two further properties of RDGU, with special attention to AZ’s
novel “existence of egalitarian equivalence” axiom. First, we show that, under a set of
minimal conditions for the normative plausibility of any approach to population ethics, this
axiom is individually sufficient to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. Then, we show that by
replacing existence of egalitarian equivalence with an alternative axiom — same-number
independence — but retaining AZ’s six other axioms we obtain a novel characterization of
critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU, Blackorby and Donaldson, 1984).
2 Setting and basic axioms
Our notation follows AZ. N are the positive integers, R are the real numbers, R++, R+, R−
are positive, nonnegative, and nonpositive.
Populations x,y are finite-length vectors of real numbers, where the ith position in
the vector x, denoted xi, is the lifetime utility of person i. Utilities are normalized so that
xi = 0 is a neutral life for person i. An index enclosed in square brackets indicates rank
from worst-off, so x[2] = 4 means that the second-lowest utility in the population is 4. For
any x, x[ ] is the nondecreasing reordering of x (note that we and AZ assume anonymity
throughout). Write x[ ] ≥ y[ ] if x[r] ≥ y[r] for all ranks r and x[ ] > y[ ] if x[r] ≥ y[r] for all
ranks r and x[r′] > y[r′] for some rank r′.
The size of x is n(x) ∈ N, so x ∈ Rn(x). (z)n is a population of n equally well-off people
with utility z each. Parentheses combine populations, so n ((x,y)) = n(x) + n(y). When
1Although the population ethics literature has long focused on avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion,
a collaboration of 29 authors from economics and philosophy has recently proposed that “avoiding the
Repugnant Conclusion is not a necessary condition for a minimally adequate candidate axiology, social
ordering, or approach to population ethics” (Zuber et al., 2021). They present several arguments, including
that the Repugnant Conclusion is not fundamentally dissimilar from related implications of many approaches
to population ethics that are commonly understood to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion (e.g. Spears and
Budolfson, 2021).
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a population x is combined with a singleton population whose only member’s lifetime
utility is z, we write this as (x, z).
The set of all possible populations is X =
⋃
n∈NRn. This paper describes %, a social
welfare relation on X, which is a binary relation with the interpretation of “at least as good
as.” The asymmetric and symmetric parts of % are  and ∼, respectively.
Three of AZ’s axioms are uncontroversial in population economics:
Axiom 1 (Order). The relation % is complete, transitive, and reflexive on X.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all n ∈ N and all x ∈ Rn, the sets {y ∈ Rn : y % x}
and {y ∈ Rn : x % y} are closed.
Axiom 3 (Suppes-Sen). For all n ∈ N and all x,y ∈ Rn, if x[ ] > y[ ], then x  y.
AZ characterize RDGU, which is defined as:























where β ∈ (0, 1) and the constant c ≥ 0 is the critical-level parameter. We characterize
CLGU, which is defined (without reference to ranks, as these are irrelevant to CLGU) as:
x % y⇔ V CLGU(x) =
n(x)∑
i=1
(g (xi)− g(c)) ≥ V CLGU(y) =
n(y)∑
i=1
(g (yi)− g(c)) (CLGU)
3 Existence of egalitarian equivalence and the Repugnant
Conclusion
Some variable-population social welfare relations entail the Repugnant Conclusion (here-
after RC), formalized by AZ as:
The Repugnant Conclusion. For all y, x ∈ R with y > x > 0 and all k ∈ N, there is n > k
such that (x)n  (y)k.
RDGU avoids the RC through a novel axiom:
Axiom 7 (Existence of egalitarian equivalence). For all x,y ∈ X, if x  y, then there exists
z ∈ R such that, for all n ∈ N, x  (z)m  y for some m ≥ n.
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AZ note that existence of egalitarian equivalence (hereafter EEE) “is weaker than
directly requiring avoidance of the [Repugnant Conclusion]” by providing a normatively
implausible example in which the value of increasing population size depends on whether
population size is odd or even. But no approach to population ethics defended in the
literature accepts EEE and the RC. This is because no normatively plausible social welfare
relation can do so, if the following two properties are minimal requirements for normative
plausibility:
• Consistent egalitarian expansion: For all x ∈ R and all k,m, n ∈ N, k ≥ m > n, if
(x)m  (x)n then (x)k % (x)m.
• Weak egalitarian negative expansion: For all x ∈ R− and all m,n ∈ N, m ≥ n,
(x)n % (x)m.
We know of no approach defended in the literature that rejects either of these properties. If
they are minimal requirements, then EEE entails avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion.
Proposition 1. No transitive social welfare relation that satisfies Suppes-Sen, consistent egalitarian
expansion, and weak egalitarian negative expansion can both satisfy existence of egalitarian
equivalence and entail the Repugnant Conclusion.
Proof. Assume that % entails the RC; we will show that no z can satisfy EEE. Fix any y, x, k,
and n from the RC and use y = (y)k and x = (x)n for EEE. First, z cannot be non-positive
because then (y)k  (z)k by Suppes-Sen and, for any ` ≥ k, (z)k % (z)` by weak egalitarian
negative expansion. Hence, by transitivity, (y)k  (z)`. Next consider 0 < z < x. By the RC
there exists n′ > n such that (z)n′  (x)n; by Suppes-Sen, (x)n  (z)n; hence, by transitivity,
(z)n′  (z)n. So, by consistent egalitarian expansion, (z)` % (z)n′ , for any ` ≥ n′; and, by
transitivity, (z)`  (x)n. Finally, for z ≥ x, let us now re-label z, which we used in the last
step, z′. Then, by Suppes-Sen, we have (z)`  (z′)`, so, by the result in the last step and
transitivity, (z)`  (x)n. This excludes all possible z.
Proposition 1 implies that the RC is ruled out even if AZ’s Axioms 1-6 are replaced by
transitivity, Suppes-Sen, consistent egalitarian expansion, and weak egalitarian negative






, number-dampened generalized utilitarianism (NDGU)




, where f is bounded, in addition
to being increasing and concave—and RDGU but ranked in descending, rather than
ascending, order. Each of these violates AZ’s Axiom 6, which is presented below.
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Is EEE an attractive axiom? As one consideration, we highlight that EEE implies that
some unboundedly large populations of negative lives will not be worse than some finite
populations of negative lives. Consider, for example, x = (−1)1 and y = (−2)1. Then z in
the statement of EEE will be a negative utility level (negative because x and y are both
negative) such that, for unboundedly large n, (z)n  (−2)1. This is true of AU, NDGU,
and RDGU.
4 Same-number independence and CLGU
In their characterization of RDGU, AZ use three further axioms which we will employ:
Axiom 4 (Existence independence of the best-off). For all n ∈ N, x,y ∈ Rn, and z ∈ R




, (x, z) % (y, z)⇔ x % y.





, (x, z) % (y, z)⇔ x % y.
Axiom 6 (Existence of a critical level). There exist c ∈ R+ and n ∈ N such that, for all x ∈ Rn
satisfying x[n] ≤ c, (x, c) ∼ x.
Instead of EEE, we add a separability axiom that only applies to comparisons of same-
sized populations:
Axiom 8 (Same-number independence). For all n,m ∈ N, for all x,y ∈ Rn, and for all
u,v ∈ Rm, (x,u) % (y,u)⇔ (x,v) % (y,v).
Same-number independence was previously studied by Blackorby, Bossert and Donald-
son (2005). It enjoys wide implicit normative acceptance in the many same-number policy
evaluations that do not incorporate estimates of the number and welfare of unaffected
(e.g., past) lives.
Theorem 1. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) % satisfies Axioms 1-6 and Axiom 8.
(ii) % is CLGU.
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Proof. We modify AZ’s method. By AZ’s Lemma 1, axioms 1-5 are sufficient for there to be
















By Theorem 4.7 of Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005), same-number independence
implies same-number generalized utilitarianism given the biconditional above, so β = 1.
Note that any fixed critical level would cancel.
By AZ’s Lemma 2, axioms 1-6 (with c ∈ R+ from axiom 6) are sufficient for there to be
























if x,y ∈ Xc, where Xc =
{
x ∈ X : x[n(x)] ≤ c
}
. Because this includes same-number cases,
β = 1. By same-number generalized utilitarianism and transitivity, Lemma 2 extends to all
x such that there exists a y ∈ Xc where x ∼ y and n(x) = n(y).
Extend Lemma 2 to all x,y ∈ X by choosing z < min{x[1], y[1], c}. For all x ∈ X,








. Then by same-number generalized utilitarianism, ∃k ∈ N
such that e ((x, (z)k)) < c and e ((y, (z)k)) < c. Then by Lemma 2 and transitivity
(x, (z)k) % (y, (z)k)⇔
n(x)∑
i
(g (xi)− g(c)) ≥
n(y)∑
i
(g (yi)− g(c)) ,
because the k z-terms cancel. By Axiom 5 and because z is worst-off, (x, (z)k) % (y, (z)k)⇔
x % y, which completes the proof.
Alternatively, we can establish constant critical levels by showing that ∀x, (x, c) ∼ x.
By same-number generalized utilitarianism, choose k ∈ N such that ξ = e ((x, (z)k)) < c.
By transitivity and then by Axiom 6, (x, (z)k) ∼ (ξ)n(x)+k ∼ ((ξ)n(x)+k, c). By same-number
generalized utilitarianism and transitivity, ((ξ)n(x)+k, c) ∼ (x, (z)k, c) ∼ (x, (z)k). So, by
repeated use of Axiom 5 (x, c) ∼ x.
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5 Discussion
AZ highlight that RDGU escapes the RC. Proposition 1 shows that it does so because of
EEE, since any minimally plausible social welfare relation (including all defended in the
population economics literature) avoids the RC if it satisfies EEE. Of course, in avoiding
the RC through one key axiom, RDGU is not unusual: Blackorby and Donaldson’s (1984)
assumption of a fixed, positive critical level is similarly sufficient to avoid the RC for any
transitive relation that satisfies same-number Pareto.2
Theorem 1 shows that the difference between RDGU and CLGU is the substitution of
same-number independence for EEE. A reader may find Axioms 1-6 apparently weaker
or more attractive than the existence independence or fixed critical level axioms that
have been used to characterized CLGU in the literature. As AZ explain: “While ordinary
critical-level generalized utilitarianism allows for unrestricted independence to adding an
individual (see Blackorby et al. 2005), our axioms impose such independence only if the
added individual is best off (relative to two allocations with the same population size) or
worst off” (p. 634). Those who are attracted to Axioms 1-6 but also want to preserve the
ordinary policy-evaluation practice of same-number independence may therefore adopt
CLGU — which includes, as special cases, priority for the worse-off (for concave g) and
utilitarianism (for linear g).
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